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Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws
Methodology
By DONALD T. TRAUTMAN*
Question 1
The editors disarmingly have put as their first question the
puzzler that judges and scholars have pondered for decades.
Doubtless, nothing said now can be the last word. I should like to
try to respond by exploring one fundamental facet of the question:
Which, if any, of the four approaches the editors ask us to consider
is best calculated to produce a satisfactory kind of justice?
These pages are hardly the place to embark on an elaborate
exposition of the theories of justice in multistate cases. I propose
to make a few plausible assumptions: that the fairness and pre-
dictability referred to by the editors as goals of the law would en-
compass the equal treatment of like cases, the advancement of the
purposes and policies of the laws at stake, and the feasibility of
achieving the twin goals of evenhandedness and responsiveness to
policy at the least cost. My answer entails some individual discus-
sion of the four approaches: (1) traditional choice-of-law rules,1 (2)
Professor Currie's form of interest analysis,2 (3) the New York va-
riant of interest analysis,s and (4) the California position as stated
in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.- I suggest one or two
basic reasons why I think each of the four approaches is unsatis-
* Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard University, A.B., 1951; J.D., 1951,
HarvaFd. University.
1. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
2. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171, 178; Currie, The Silver Oar and All that: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1, 69 (1959).
3. The New York approach is best illustrated in the guest statute cases, beginning
with Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), and
culminating in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969),
which fully summarizes the intervening cases, and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286
N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
4. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
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factory standing alone. Each, on the other hand, has values to con-
tribute to a tenable method, and I propose, in what is necessarily a
very brief compass, to suggest one or two values of each that
should be preserved.
Traditional methods have been thoroughly canvassed and
nothing new needs to be said here;5 what needs to be emphasized is
that traditional methods rest on premises that are no longer con-
sidered to be valid. In their heyday, the vested rights theories ulti-
mately embodied in the first Restatement of Conflicts were conso-
nant with formal approaches to justice that sought predictability
and uniformity at any price. The price-failure to respond to pol-
icy-has proved too high a price to pay." Alabama Great Southern
Railroad v. Carroll" and Gray v. Gray" both embodied methods
that were calculated to produce predictable results and to treat all
tort cases alike. Apart from the great difficulties in determining
where the injury occurred, there existed a likelihood that the con-
clusion regarding where the injury occurred9 would point to a juris-
diction not concerned with the issue presented, as was true in Ala-
bama Railroad and Gray. The approach repeatedly failed to
advance any discernible policy.10 Ultimately, its inability to meet
5. See, e.g., A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS Chs.
1, 2 (1965); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 65-67 (1965).
6. Professor Currie's writings elaborately illustrate the proposition. See generally B.
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). See also von Mehren, Choice of
Law and the Problems of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27 (1977). The failure of for-
mal approaches to respond to policy is of course not a phenomenon peculiar to choice of law.
See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976).
7. 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). In Carroll, recovery under the Alabama Employer's
Liability Act was denied to an Alabama workman hired in Alabama by an Alabama railroad
corporation because the injury occurred in Mississippi where the common law fellow-servant
rule still prevailed.
8. 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934). In Gray, a New Hampshire wife was denied recovery
in an action against her husband for injuries received in Maine, where interspousal suits in
tort were still forbidden.
9. This difficulty remains unresolved for cases in which it may still be relevant. See,
e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (Supreme Court,
in considering the possible relevance of the location of a maritime tort to jurisdiction in
admirality, left the question more unsettled than it had previously been thought to be).
10. Difficulties in dealing with the problem of Gray played a significant role in the
discussion that led to the abandonment of traditional methods in the Restatement (Second)
of Conflicts. Initial efforts to dispose of the problem by recharacterizing interspousal immu-
nity as a family law issue proved unacceptable. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, § 390g (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 154, 169 (1971) (adopted version).
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the goals of administrability and of responsiveness to policy under-
mined its ability to achieve even the goal of treating like cases
alike,11 and the method universally lost acceptance. The traditional
method did, however, purport to view choice-of-law issues from a
multistate perspective rather than from a perspective oriented to-
wards a particular jurisdiction; this nondiscrimination across juris-
dictional boundaries is a value to be preserved if at all possible.
Professor Currie's form of interest analysis focused on the
goals of maximizing administrability and of producing solutions
that were responsive to policy. In elaborating his particular version
of interest analysis, however, Professor Currie espoused several
views that I find untenable. Space limitations preclude adequate
exposition, but I can at least identify some of the propositions with
which I disagree and briefly state my reasons for disagreeing. First,
Professor Currie reasoned that the interest to be examined is "gov-
ernmental." Characterizing these interests as governmental ignores
the fact that often the interests involved are individual interests in
private ordering. Although these individual interests are respected
and often nurtured by governmental authority, the emphasis on
the governmental nature of the interest downplays a vast area of
lawmaking by individuals and often tends to distort the issue. Sec-
ond, Professor Currie maintained that the policies to be identified
are in the main those underlying the substantive law of the partic-
ular communities. In contrast, I think what have been called "mul-
tistate policies ' '12 often are quite significant, and, although these
policies are not entirely overlooked in Professor Currie's writings,
they play too small a role in the elaboration of his theories by him
and his successors. Finally, Professor Currie stated that in cases of
conflict, the forum (after perhaps exercising some undefined degree
of moderation and restraint in assessing its own, and perhaps the
other community's, interest) should apply its own law. The pur-
poses and policies to be advanced thus are not viewed from a mul-
tistate perspective, but from an arbitrarily limited and parochial
focus, and as a result there is a failure to advance some of the pur-
poses and policies at stake. The decision to apply forum law thus
11. See von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 27, 33, 43 (1977).
12. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 215-326
(1965); Trautman, The Relation between American Choice of Law and Federal Common
Law, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 105, 106-08 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Trautman]; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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ultimately defeats both goals I have stated; in addition it seems
impermissible and essentially lawless in a multistate society. As
stated at the outset, however, the examination of purpose and pol-
icy revitalized by Professor Currie's writings 8 and the effort to
make choice of law responsive to policy is a great value to be pre-
served in any emerging theory.
I have examined the New York variant of interest analysis
elsewhere. 4 By the time of Neumeier v. Keuhner,'6 New York had
acceded to a narrow and parochial interest analysis that equated,
as Professor Currie on occasion also seemed to do, the interest of
New York with the pocketbooks of New Yorkers. As Professor von
Mehren has shown, if New York had assessed its own policies and
purposes with a view to advancing them rather than focusing on
the economic interests of New Yorkers, justice could have been
done." The flaw in the New York variant of interest analysis thus
is in viewing policy from an unreasonably narrow perspective. The
method as worked out in Neumeier fails not only in terms of ad-
ministrability and like treatment of like cases, but it produces a
result totally out of line with New York's commendable policy of
compensation, a policy emerging at various rates of growth in all
jurisdictions. Viewing the problem from a multistate perspective
would show that New York is in line with, and perhaps leading,
general developments in tort law that subordinate certain rela-
tively nonfunctional protective mechanisms, such as guest statutes,
to the interest in compensating those injured by the negligence of
another.
New York's interest analysis, in addition to emphasizing, as
does Professor Currie's interest analysis, an examination of pur-
pose and policy, also on occasion has purported to proceed nondis-
criminatorily. Parochialism ultimately did prevail in Neumeier,
but it did not in cases such as in re Estate of Clark," in which a
Virginia domiciliary's effort to use New York law to defeat his
13. I say revitalized because I would suppose that Professor Cavers and some others
writing at the time of Professor Cavers's original article had already given vitality to these
ideas. See, e.g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173
(1933).
14. See Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1
VT. L. RE V. 1 (1976).
15. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
16. See von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 27, 34-36 (1977). See also Trautman, supra note 12, at 115-16.
17. 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
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widow's forced-share interest in his estate under Virginia law was
unsuccessful. New York policy, in a case not involving a New
Yorker's pocketbook, was seen correctly as calling for respect for
Virginia policy.
Finally, I come to the California version of interest analysis,
which I hope will be explained more fully by others in this dia-
logue. In assessing the comparative impairment test, I recognize
that the test means various things to various people. We are told
authoritatively that the version of interest analysis adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Offshore Rental'8 is defective and a
perversion of the test proposed by Professors Baxter and
Horowitz, 9 in that it should not be used in place of, or in addition
to, Professor Currie's "moderation and restraint," and in that it
calls for judicial weighing of the current vitality and strength of
policy.20 These particular flaws, however, are to me the most
praiseworthy aspects of the Offshore Rental opinion. Recognizing,
then, that the Offshore Rental opinion states a significantly differ-
ent test from the one proposed by Professor Baxter, I feel I am at
liberty to take the opinion as the authoritative statement of a com-
parative impairment test.
Elsewhere I have urged precisely the kind of weighing that the
California Supreme Court undertook and the propriety of that un-
dertaking.2' Offshore Rental was a superb case for this weighing
process. If the common law action for recovery of loss of services of
a servant is in disarray in many states, it would seem to be so in
California. If one seeks a normative view-one to be anticipated by
all engaging in multistate activity-from which departures must be
justified, as I have urged, one reaches the same result as the Cali-
18. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978).
19. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963);
Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California: A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719
(1974). The courts, in citing these authors, seems not to appreciate the extent to which it
departs from their proposals.
20. See Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577 (1980).
21. Trautman, supra note 12, at 106-08. From this perspective, the Offshore Rental
case seems to me even more easily subject to the analysis which I proposed for its well-
known predecessor, Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1961). Professor Currie himself seems to have recognized the utility of such an approach.
See, e.g., Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation In the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205, 220 (1958), reprinted in CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLICTS OF LAWS 128, 143 (1963).
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fornia court.
This conclusion rests, as I have stated, on an assumption that
the common law action for recovery of loss of services of a servant
is becoming obsolete. If that is so,2 2 what the California court did
in the Offshore Rental case can in my view be explained along the
following lines: rather than addressing the difficult question of
whether the action is obsolete and ready to be paid its final re-
spects in California, the court-like any good common law
court-decided only what it had to, that is, as the policies underly-
ing the action were on the wane, a less than clearly concerned ju-
risdiction like California should not diverge from the norm now
emerging in many states and prevailing in Louisiana, the jurisdic-
tion presumptively most concerned. In these circumstances,23 to
hold the defendant in the Offshore case liable under California law
might defeat expectations or otherwise be unfair. On the assump-
tion that the normal rule today is clearly in line with that of Loui-
siana, California should consider applying a contrary rule only if
that divergent rule reflected a current strong policy of California
and if California's relationship to the transaction justified assertion
of that policy.24 Plainly neither was the case. An approach along
these lines seems to me more conducive to fairness and predictabil-
ity than any other: the values and purposes of the law are viewed
from a multistate perspective and like cases, at least like multi-
state cases, will be treated alike. Whether such a test is adminis-
trable is of course an important question; there have been too
many instances-guest statutes, interspousal immunity, charitable
immunity, and now the Offshore Rental case-in which the ap-
22. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 938 (4th ed. 1971) ("[The rule] has,
however, been under considerable attack of late, and clearly is to be quite narrowly confined
within its original limits." (footnote omitted)).
23. Uncertainty about the continued vitality of the cause of action may also explain
the otherwise puzzling decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Standard Oil of
California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947), refusing to create by judicial decision a federal right to
recover for loss of services of a soldier. Roundly criticized for its apparent judicial abnega-
tion, see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 541-46 (Tent. ed. 1958), the decision is
perhaps entitled to be viewed with less outrage. If the state law generally is pulling away
from the action for loss of services of a servant, it is doubtful that federal common law
should revitalize the action; as I have urged elsewhere, federal common law should begin
with and build on state law, departing from state law only to the extent precisely needed to
respond to unique federal problems. See Trautman, supra note 12.
24. Cf. Trautman, supra note 12, at 21; Trautman, A Comment on Twerski and
Mayer: A Pragmatic Step towards Consensus as a Basis for Choice-of-Law Solutions, 7
HOFSTRA L. REv. 833 (1979).
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proach has not proven to be so inadequate as to allow it to be re-
jected out of hand on grounds of administrability.
Question 2
I would not think that the basic problem with an interest
analysis is a judicial inability to ascertain the policies underlying a
state's rule or doctrine. Identifying policy and purpose is a basic
task of courts, which, by and large, is carried out with wisdom and
often distinction.
The problems involved in judicial determinations of the poli-
cies underlying a state's law appear far more imposing and unusual
than they are because of the tradition of viewing choice of law as a
conflict between the law and policies of two distinct, self-contained
communities about which there is no information other than what
can be found in the authoritative materials of those communities. 2
When, however, communities share a common legal tradition and
history, as is ordinarily so with respect to many problems within
the United States, it is usually not difficult to understand the poli-
cies, although local circumstances may condition the speed and di-
rection of maturation and adaptation to new problems. Seen from
a comparative and historical perspective, the conflicts of laws in
Alabama Railroad,26 Gray27 and Offshore Rental" can be under-
stood relatively easily on the basis that, in these instances, the law
in Mississippi, Maine, and California, respectively, had developed
more slowly and had been less ready to accept the implications of
new social, economic, and political factors common to all American
jurisdictions than it had in other states.29 Signs of the policies that
were emerging could have been found in those jurisdictions, and
they were in fact present in the law of Alabama, New Hampshire,
and Louisiana, respectively.
There will of course be extremely difficult cases of identifying
policy. Even in those instances, interest analysis, properly con-
25. See Trautman, supra note 12, at 105-06, 108-11, 126-27. See also Trautman, A
Comment on Twerski and Mayer: A Pragmatic Step towards Consensus as a Basis for
Choice-of-Law Solutions, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 833 (1979).
26. Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
27. Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934).
28. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978).
29. With respect to Alabama Railroad, this includes western European jurisdictions as
well. See S. RIESENFELD & R. MAXWELL, MODERN SocIAL LEGISLATION 127-36 (1950).
[Vol. 32
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ceived, formulates the issue correctly for courts, and our history
demonstrates the strength and vitality of judicial analysis when is-
sues are properly formulated. Difficulties in the application of an
interest analysis occur most often when judges are told to consider
improper factors, such as the artificial bias in favor of the law of
the forum, or to follow the dubious premise that state courts only
act as instrumentalities of the local legislature in resolving choice-
of-law questions and cannot view the problem from a multistate
perspective3 0
Question 3
Abstractions in the law often develop a life of their own for a
time. In choice of law, domicile is an abstraction that often was
purported to have content and significance unrelated to the pur-
pose for which it was being used.3 1 Such growth of a concept unre-
lated to purpose and function is always treacherous and ultimately
self-destructive, and I do not suppose that the notions of true, ap-
parent true, and false conflict will become clear and stable con-
cepts that can be anything more than helpful and often economical
approximations tied to quite uncertain and shifting underlying
notions.
Professor Currie's interest analysis uses the distinction be-
tween false and true conflicts to decide the issue of how far a fo-
rum with some concern in a matter will go in judging that its con-
cern should be interpreted with moderation and restraint in light
of another community's conflicting concern. That issue in turn is
to be decided by reference to the proposition that courts should
not perform a "legislative" function of weighing competing policy.
I do not believe that kind of question will ever reach such a degree
of simplicity and obviousness that courts will judge the question
with ease and some uniformity. I have never understood how Bern-
krant v. Fowler3 2 in California was ultimately a case of false con-
flict; In re Estate of Crichtonss in New York is also difficult for me
30. See Trautman, supra note 12, at 127. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971) (mandating observance of directive of forum's own state legislature on
choice of law).
31. See 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 159-72 (2d ed.
1958); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 173-74 (1965).
32. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
33. 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
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to understand in those terms. Both cases are quite understandable
upon full analysis of all the relevant policies and assessment of the
appropriateness of the concern of the respective jurisdictions with
those policies in light of the relationship between the jurisdictions
and the transaction. To compress all these considerations into a
distinction between false and true conflicts is far more than the
categories can bear.
The terms true and false conflicts. can be useful when used de-
scriptively and not dispositively. So employed, these concepts help
to direct our thinking towards whether further analysis and re-
course to other premises will be required to resolve a conflict.
Great difficulty arises, on the other hand, when courts or writers
use the terms dispositively and, for example, regard situations as
ones of false conflict when, descriptively, that is not the case.
Question 4
I am strongly opposed to inviting legislative resolution of
choice-of-law questions-certainly if the legislature is that of one
of the concerned communities, for example, one of two or more
states of the United States-and even if the legislature is that of
an overarching legal order having authority over both the con-
cerned communities, for example, the Congress of the United
States exercising powers under the full faith and credit clause,3 in
a conflict involving the states. I believe legislative direction is in-
herently incapable of capturing the nuance and sophistication nec-
essary for just and satisfactory choice-of-law solutions; such experi-
ence as we have supports that conclusion. 5 Certainly, there is no
evidence that Congress has been successful in coping with the com-
parable problems of balance and accommodation when dealing
with the similarly complex interstate or federal-state conflicts
under the commerce clause.38
An apt illustration may be provided by Lauritzen v. Larsen,37
34. Cf. U.S. CONST. art IV § 1. See Trautman, supra note 12, at 114 n.36.
35. See, e.g., 5 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 544A, at 3775 (3d ed. 1967) (criticizing New
York's codification of conflict of laws in the area of testamentary dispositions).
36. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, LAW OF MULTIS-
TATE PROBLEMS 304 (1965). Cf. id. at 1051-1059; D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PROCESS
245-49 (1965).
37. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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in which Justice Jackson, considering language in the Jones Act s
calling for the Act's application to "any seaman,"39 wrote what
continues to be one of the finest modern choice-of-law opinions.
Certainly no legislation could capture the sense of the opinion, and
even later judicial efforts to simplify and crystallize the Lauritzen
analysis have proven troublesome.'
Another facet of the problem of legislative direction-one of
the many that would require discussion in a full answer to this
question41-was presented to the Supreme Court in the celebrated
case of Moragne v. States Marines Lines, Inc.'2 Justice Harlan's
opinion provides a fruitful illustration of a final suggestion I would
make. In Moragne, among the questions presented was whether
Congress, in limiting the Death on the High Seas Act'3 to the high
seas, intended to preclude the creation of federal nonlegislative
remedies within territorial waters. The Act's limitation is a fair ex-
ample of the inadequacy of legislative prescription of choice of law,
and the Supreme Court so viewed it. After exploring the purpose
of the limitation and the problem it addressed-that of extending
remedies to the high seas because at the time it was thought the
states could not provide such remedies-it was an easy matter for
the Court to conclude that the limitation lacked significance for
the problem before it.
At another point in the Moragne opinion, Justice Harlan
demonstrated how wise and sensitive courts can be to the relevant
aspects of legislative materials, reviving earlier suggestions by
Dean Pound and Dean Landis that a statute can provide principles
from which to reason by analogy.4" In Moragne, Justice Harlan was
38. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (current version at 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1976)).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Bartholomew v.
Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959).
41. See generally H. HAT & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1144-1417 (Tent. ed.
1958) (discussion of different methods and problems of statutory interpretation).
42. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
43. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976).
44 See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. R-v. 383, 385 (1908):
"[Courts] might receive [a statute] fully into the body of the law as affording not only a rule
to be applied but a principle from which to reason, and hold it, as a later and more direct
expression of the general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same general
subject; and so reason from it by analogy in preference to them." See also Landis, Statutes
and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYs 213 (1934); Note, The Legitimacy of
Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258
CONFLICT OF LAWSJuly 1981]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
able to demonstrate a general or normal attitude in our law in
favor of wrongful death actions and to justify creation of such an
action by judicial decision when, because of the wooden choice-of-
law provisions that are an almost universal feature of death acts,45
no death act reached the geographical area involved. Justice
Harlan concluded, as I have suggested can often be done, that
there was a normal rule and that there was no reason to suppose
that any policy existed against acceptance of that rule for the
problem presented, although no authoritative legislative or judicial
materials actually supported the rule's acceptance for the limited
geographical area involved.46
Question 5
Even if the question whether the Supreme Court is "tighten-
ing" jurisdictional standards is answerable, it is somewhat beside
the point, like asking whether Justice Frankfurter was a liberal or
a conservative. More pertinent is that movement is occurring,
movement away from older jurisdictional mechanisms inspired by
thinking in terms of power over persons or things and towards
more modern mechanisms inspired, I trust, by functional think-
ing.47 This transition necessarily involves tightening up when the
more literal manifestations of power theory have diminishing func-
tional bases, as in the quasi-in-rem mechanism and perhaps the
mechanism under which personal jurisdiction is based on service
on a transient individual, and loosening up when mechanisms not
easily justified on a power basis clearly have functional justifica-
tions, as in the mechanisms illustrated by International Shoe Co.
v. Washington,'48 McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,49 and
(1972).
- 45. A similar opportunity was presented in the litigation that culminated in Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). Judge Kaufman made the sensible
suggestion that New York could in that situation have extended the New York death act by
judicial decision, see 307 F.2d 131, 136, 141 n.13 (Kaufman, J., dissenting); had the New
York Court of Appeals taken that approach, it would have obviated Judge Friendly's diffi-
culties (see 309 F.2d 553, 564, 565) with the constitutionality of the decision in Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
46. Moragne v. States Marines Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
47. For a full statement of views that can only be touched briefly here, see von Mehren
& Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAnv. L. Ray. 1121
(1966) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren & Trautman].
48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.5 0
Having said that, I should dispel any undue optimism about
what is happening: power theories have not yet been rendered
powerless, and I fear that much heavy sailing lies ahead. Interna-
tional Shoe, as has been ably pointed out elsewhere,51 essentially
straddled power and functional theories; it moved almost effort-
lessly from "minimum contacts" language to language about tradi-
tional notions of fair play, as if they were much the same thing.
What has followed International Shoe is not especially reassuring;
I wish it were possible to say that the Supreme Court is now en-
gaged in the case by case elaboration of new doctrine. What one
could hope to expect from McGee or Mullane, however, seemed
counterbalanced by Hanson v. Denkla,52 and the ambivalence re-
mains in the various opinions in Shaffer v. Heitner" and in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson."
It is not appropriate here to identify and examine the conflict-
ing strains in these latest opinions; nor do I feel that I could do
justice to the possible implications of these important decisions in
these pages. It may be more useful to call attention to one range of
issues to which I hope the Supreme Court will turn and which the
Court will have to confront in order to move decisively from power
theories to functionalism. As Professor von Mehren and I have
suggested, a functional approach would call for an assessment of
the relative positions of the plaintiff and the defendant.55 What
one finds in Shaffer, however, is that one should consider the rela-
tion of the defendant and of the controversy to the forum. The
opinion gives no attention to the plaintiff's relation to the forum or
to a comparison of the plaintiff's and defendant's relation to the
forum. Occasionally a reference to the "parties'" relationship to
the forum occurs; we are entitled to assume that such language is
considered, but we are left without any further elaboration. Do the
writers of such language intend to portend more for the future or
simply to touch all bases of the existing literature?
If one allows oneself to ask something about the relative posi-
50. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
51. Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26
KAN. L. Rav. 61 (1977).
52. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
53. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
54. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
55. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 47, at 1166-73.
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tion and needs of the plaintiff as well as the defendant, one should
feel comfortable, as Professor von Mehren and I have tried to
show, about all the cases involving localized plaintiffs and essen-
tially multistate defendants, such as the products liability cases56
and McGee. What can be said on this score of Shaffer and World-
Wide Volkswagen?
What significance might one attach to considering whether the
plaintiff, in a shareholder's derivative suit such as Shaffer, was a
resident of Delaware? The plaintiff's residence could have been,
but was not, important in some quasi-in-rem cases. For example, it
is doubtful that the outcomes in Pennoyer v. Neffl7 and Harris v.
Balk5s would have been any different had the plaintiffs not been
residents of the forum. Although the plaintiff's residence was not
considered "relevant" under a power theory, it certainly seemed to
become decisive in the recent cases that sought to justify the
Seider v. Roth59 mechanism. 0 In the Shaffer situation, the conven-
ience to the plaintiff of pursuing a derivative action against a di-
rector in the corporate headquarters61 might be relevant. Of
course, as Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Shaffer high-
lights, 2 Delaware had not sought to work out a functionally con-
ceived mechanism for derivative actions, and the Supreme Court
had no occasion to go further. In a functional arrangement, much
could be said for jurisdiction in the corporate headquarters, both
56. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IU.2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). In Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
443, 209 N.E.2d 76, 261 N.Y. S.2d 208 (1965), the court was faced with disputed personal
jurisdiction in three consolidated cases. One of these cases, Feathers v. McLucas, presented
a prototypical fact situation, but the court interpreted New York's personal jurisdiction
statutes as preventing it from assuming jurisdiction. Id. at 458, 209 N.E.2d at 76, 261
N.Y.S.2d at 19. Professor von Mehren and I have argued that jurisdiction should exist in
such a case. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 47, at 1170-71.
57. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
58. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
59. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
60. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1969) (justifying Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), in part on the basis that the mecha-
nism is available only to plaintiffs who are residents of the forum. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21
N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967)).
61. Whether the corporate headquarters for this purpose ought always to be its place
of incorporation is a question that might remain open, as a matter worth assessing along
with all other circumstances, when the corporation has most of its ties with some state other
than the state of incorporation.
62. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 221 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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as a convenience to the plaintiff, giving assurance that some forum
is always available, and to the defendant. Such an arrangement
would also serve to assure a forum likely to have an interest in the
substantive outcome.
Similarly, viewing World-Wide Volkswagen's from the plain-
tiff's perspective may not provide an easy solution to the difficult
problem presented by the case, but at least could give some assis-
tance in thinking about the issue. The plaintiff, it should be ob-
served, was not a resident of Oklahoma but was in transit from
New York to California. The accident occurred in Oklahoma, but if
there was no substantive issue of tort law on which Oklahoma had
a special view that deserved to be recognized by providing an
Oklahoma forum, there may have been no significant argument for
jurisdiction as against any of the four defendants. If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff had been a resident of Oklahoma, reasons might
have emerged for striking the balance differently depending on the
identity of the defendant. Like Shaffer, then, World-Wide Volks-
wagen does not present a good occasion for exploration of this im-
portant range of issues.
Question 6
The question implies that one might seriously consider re-
stricting access to courts in order to avoid difficult choice-of-law
issues. I would demur to any such proposal.
As Professor von Mehren and I have argued elsewhere," juris-
diction and choice of law are intricately interrelated; if choice of
law is functioning poorly, jurisdiction may need to be restricted.
All choice-of-law theories that embody an artificial bias for forum
law, as do Professor Currie's, Professor Ehrenzweig's, and to some
extent the New York variant of interest analysis, present the prob-
lem. The solution, however, is not to restrict jurisdiction but to
weed out the parochialism in the choice-of-law method.
To restrict jurisdiction is likely to have undesirable conse-
quences and may not provide any solution. Ever since Livingston
v. Jefferson,65 which applied the old rule that actions involving ti-
tle to land are to be limited to the situs, we have understood the
63. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
64. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 47, at 1131-33.
65. 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
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potential for unfairness involved in unduly restricting access to the
courts. In that case, the plaintiff was left with no court in which to
vindicate his rights, as service on Thomas Jefferson could not be
had in the Louisiana situs.
The restrictions one is likely to hit upon, if one does proceed
to limit jurisdiction, are not likely to be good solutions. Livingston
is one illustration, but perhaps the most telling example would
emerge if one tried to find jurisdictional solutions that would obvi-
ate the many recent choice-of-law difficulties in tort. I think it is
clear that it would not be any improvement to limit access to
courts in tort cases to the place of injury. Forum law would be
applied more often, but no one would assert that there had been
any improvement in the general situation. Indeed, the tendency to
gloss over choice-of-law difficulties would be likely to increase, as
would jurisdictional unfairness.
What has been said can perhaps be supported by noting that
when jurisdiction is based on a controversy's relation to the forum,
as in instances of specific jurisdiction, there is lamentably little
consideration of any choice-of-law difficulties that might arise. The
result in Gray," however, would be no more palatable if Maine
were the only place where the litigation could occur; the result
would only be more likely there. We have observed a similar phe-
nomenon with the Seider v. Roth67 mechanism, which tends, I
think, to provide an argument for a shift in choice of law to the
forum without any substantive basis for that shift. These instances
reinforce my view that choice of law is not likely to improve with
jurisdictional tinkering.
Question 7
If one could say that the policies underlying choice of law and
jurisdiction are identical, presumably choice of law and jurisdiction
could go hand in glove. There have been remarks, notably by Jus-
tice Black, to the effect that choice of law and jurisdiction are
closely "related and to a substantial degree depend on similar con-
siderations." 68 Such statements must be addressed to instances in
which the jurisdictional question hinges on the controversy's rela-
66. Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934).
67. See notes 59-60 supra.
68. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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tion to the forum, as in specific jurisdiction, 9 and should not be
taken to suggest that the policies supporting general jurisdiction or
access to courts for litigational convenience of the parties and wit-
nesses should have a bearing on choice of law. Even in that part of
jurisdictional thinking in which the controversy's relation to the
forum is significant, I think it would be unwise to make the transi-
tion between jurisdiction and choice of law quite as simple as Jus-
tice Black's statement might suggest.
Two good reasons, among perhaps many, are worth suggesting
here. First, jurisdictional decisions should be easier than choice-of-
law decisions, so that appropriate judgments can be made about
jurisdiction prior to the hearing on the merits. The place of injury
may often be an appropriate place for a trial in tort to occur, al-
though use of the law of the place of injury may be much less often
warranted. Second, perhaps as a consequence of the first reason,
choice of law is today far more intricate than jurisdictional think-
ing. We are quite prepared to deal with the issue of interspousal
immunity in Gray70 as a different issue from the standard of negli-
gence; are we prepared to suggest that Maine might have jurisdic-
tion to hear the issue of negligence but not the issue of inter-
spousal immunity? It seems doubtful to me that drawing these
distinctions is useful and administratively feasible. Certainly, one
does not want to split up a lawsuit jurisdictionally simply because
one is prepared to accept depeqage and let some issues in a case be
governed by one law and others by another. I would be happier if
we tried to keep the questions of choice of law and jurisdiction
separate in our thinking while recognizing, as I suggested in answer
to the last question, the close interrelation between the questions
themselves.
69. For the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction, see von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 47, at 1136.
70. Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934).
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